In the health IoT (Internet of Things), the specialized sensor devices can be used to monitor remote health and notify the emergency information, e.g., blood pressure, heart rate, etc. These data can help the doctors to rescue the patients. In cloud-based health IoT, patients' medical/health data is managed by the cloud service providers. Secure storage and privacy preservation are indispensable for the outsourced medical/health data in cloud computing. In this paper, we study the integrity checking and sharing of outsourced private medical/health records for critical patients in public clouds (ICS). The patient can check his own medical/health data integrity and retrieve them. When a patient is in coma, some authorized entities and hospital can cooperate to share the patient's necessary medical/health data in order to rescue the patient. The paper studies the system model, security model and concrete scheme for ICS in public clouds. Based on the bilinear pairing technique, we design an efficient ICS protocol. Through security analysis and performance analysis, the proposed protocol is provably secure and efficient.
Introduction
IoT can be used in the healthcare applications. It plays a significant role from managing chronic diseases at one end of the spectrum to preventing disease at the other, such as clinical care and remote monitoring. In the life of every people, the generated medical data and the health data is very large. In the medical research, the researchers will process massive medical health data. Massive data processing and information security risk call for the new computation model as an alternative to conventional computing. As a new computation model, cloud computing has become a reality along with the development of network and computer technology. Cloud computing provides a flexible, dynamic, resilient and cost effective infrastructure for the business environments. For the patients and hospital, the remote medical/health data integrity checking and sharing can be performed by the patients and hospital. Since the medical/health data is outside the control of patients and hospital, cloud service providers are more responsible for the security of application services, especially in public clouds. Based on public cloud server's benefits and security risks, the paper focuses on privacypreserving remote medical/health data integrity checking and sharing for critical patients in public clouds.
Throughout the paper, "privacy-preserving ICS" is simplified as "ICS", "public cloud server" is simplified as "PCS".
Motivation
Along with the development of IoT, it is widely used in the field of healthcare. By using the IoT, massive health data is generated. On the other hand, when the patient goes to the hospital, the medical data is also generated. These generated medical/health data can be used in order to rescue the patients. In the cloud-based health IoT, the medical/health data is stored in public clouds. In public clouds, the hospitals and patients access PCS via Internet. To protect the hospital's benefits, it is important to prevent unauthorized entities to check these data integrity. If the malicious competitors can check these data integrity, they can evaluate these data size. Then, the competitors can evaluate the hospital's daily business volume. Then, the competitors can take measures to prevail the hospital. In order to protect these data, the remote data integrity checking can only be performed by the hospital besides of the patient. Usually, in order to protect the patients' privacy, only the patient can retrieve his own medical/health data. Unfortunately, the critical patients may be in a coma before reaching the hospital. In this case, the hospital and the patient's relatives should be able to cooperate to share the patient's medical/health data in order to rescue him. This real social requirement motivates us to study privacy-preserving remote medical/health data integrity checking and sharing for critical patients in public clouds.
Related Work
The rapidly developed IoT has been widely applied in the medical/health field [1] , [2] . Based on the special properties of medical/health data, when IoT is used in the medical/health field, some security risks emerge [3] , [4] . In 2015, Wu et al. proposed employment of the regenerating codes Copyright c 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers and symmetric-key encryption with a Blom based key management [5] . Their scheme can repair the lost fragment and protect data secrecy. When the medical/health data is stored on the PCS, the remote data integrity checking and sharing become an urgent security problem which needs to be solved. In 2014, Wang et al. proposed the fair remote retrieval of outsourced private medical records in electronic health networks [6] . Lu et al. proposed privacy preserving opportunistic computing framework for mobile-health care emergency [7] . In 2016, He et al. introduced a novel network security architecture for cloud computing considering characteristics of cloud computing [8] . Their scheme can protect external and internal traffics in cloud computing. It can also attain flexible scalability with respect to virtual middle box load and achieve fault-tolerant among virtual middle box failure.
Since these privacy-aware medical/health data is stored on the untrusted third party PCS, it is important to keep these data uncorrupted and privacy-preserving. As an efficient remote data integrity checking model, the concept of provable data integrity (PDP) was proposed by G. Ateniese et al. in 2007 [9] . They also designed two concrete statically secure PDP schemes. Since PDP is a very efficient remote data integrity checking model, many researchers proposed a variety of PDP security models and concrete schemes [10] - [14] .
Privacy-preservation is an important security issue in cloud computing. In 2013, Wang et al. proposed the privacy-preserving public auditing in cloud computing [15] . Nabeel et al. proposed privacy preserving policy based content sharing in public clouds [16] . Guo et al. proposed the variable threshold-value authentication architecture for wireless mesh networks [17] . In the medical/health data cloud storage, privacy preservation is especially important. Only the patient and the authorized entities can get the patient's medical/health data. PDP protocols are classified into two categories: private PDP and public PDP. Some private information is necessary to perform private PDP. The private information is not needed for public PDP.
Our Contribution and Organization
In this paper, we propose the novel concept of ICS. Then, we give the formal system model and security model of ICS. By using the bilinear pairings, an efficient ICS protocol is designed. Through security analysis and performance analysis, our ICS protocol is provably secure and efficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminaries and Sect. 3 describes our pairing-based ICS protocol and analyzes its security. Section 4 gives the performance analysis of our ICS protocol. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
ICS system model and security model are proposed in this section. After that, bilinear pairings and some corresponding difficult problems are also described below.
System Model and Security Model
ICS system consists of four different network entities: Patient, Hospital, AuthSet, PCS. They can be identified below.
1. Patient, whose medical/health data will be uploaded to PCS for maintenance and computation, is individual human being; 2. Hospital, which diagnoses the patients and generates the medical/health data for the patients, can be physicians or medical institutions; 3. AuthSet, which is the patient's authorized entity set, can cooperate with the hospital to share the patient's medical/health data; 4. PCS, which is managed by cloud service provider, has significant storage space and computation resource to maintain the patients' data. The following definitions 2, 3, 4 define the security against the malicious PCS forgery, restrictive remote medical/health data integrity checking and restrictive retrievabil-ity. 
Definition 1 (ICS
i, j , T i, j , z, X j , Y, Z, ω j , Sign(ω j )) → {"success", " f ailure"}
Definition 2 (Integrity Against Malicious PCS). ICS protocol satisfies the integrity if any PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary
I 1 = {(i, j)} in First-Phase Queries.
Challenge: C generates a data integrity challenge chal p which defines the challenged block-tag pair index collection
I c = {(i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), · · · , (i c , j c )}
In the above ICS game, we say that A wins if
where p(k) is a polynomial of the security parameter k. A secure ICS protocol also needs to guarantee that after validating the PCS-generated proof, the verifier can also be convinced that all of his outsourced data has been kept intact with a high probability. The following security definition gives the security property.
Definition 3 (Restrictive Integrity Checking
Definition 5 ((ρ, δ) Security). An ICS protocol is (ρ, δ)-secure if PCS corrupted ρ fraction of the whole medical/health blocks, the probability that the corrupted blocks are detected is at least δ.
Bilinear Pairings and Difficult Problems
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order q. Letê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map.ê can be constructed by the modified Weil or Tate pairings on elliptic curves [18] , [19] . The group with such a mapê is called a bilinear group, on which the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is assumed hard while the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy [20] . W =ê(g, g) abc ∈ G 2 .
Definition 6 (Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Group

Our Proposed Pairing-Based ICS Protocol
ICS Protocol Construction
Our ICS protocol consists of seven phases: (SetUp, EncTagGen, CheckTagSign, GenProof, GenRetr, CheckProof, Retrieval) among PCS, Hospital, Patient, and AuthSet. Suppose there are n p patients whose set is denoted as P, i.e., P = {ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID n p }. Suppose the patient ID j will upload n j block-tag pairs. Denote the corresponding blockpatient index set as
Let n denote the whole block number, i.e., n = n p j=1 n j . Let f and Ω be two pseudo-random functions, and let π be a pseudo-random permutation. Let H, h be two cryptographic hash functions. They are described below.
Let g be a generator of G 1 . Without loss of generality, we only consider the patient ID j in the concrete scheme construction. Denote ID j 's medical/health data as M j . The patient ID j picks a random x j ∈ Z * q as his private key and computes X j = g x j as his public key. On the other hand, ID j picks a random sk j ∈ Z * q as his symmetric encryption/decryption key. The hospital picks a random number y ∈ Z * q as its private key and computes Y = g y as its public key. PCS picks a random number z ∈ Z * q as its private key and computes Z = g z as its public key. The phases of our proposed ICS protocol are described below.
SetUp: The patient ID j delegates his remote medical/health data retrieval capability to the authorized entity set AuthSet j . Suppose that n s j entities share ID j 's symmetric key and th j entities can retrieve ID j 's remote medical/health data by cooperating with the hospital. Let the authorized entity set be AuthSet j = {D j,1 , D j,2 , · · · , D j,s j } and D j,i ∈ Z * q (it can be realized by using the hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z * q ). Let (Sign, Verify) be secure signature/verification algorithm pairs. In order to restrict the authorized entities' behaviors, for every entity D j,i , ID j creates the warrant ω j and Sign(ω j ) by using his own private key x j . The warrant ω j describes the rules which must be obeyed by D j,i . For the symmetric encryption key sk j , ID j generates the corresponding shares below.
1. Pick the random a j,1 , a j,2 , · · · , a j,th j −1 ∈ Z * q and get the following polynomial with the order th j − 1: Finally, ID j picks a public random element u j ∈ G *
.
The final system parameters are
EncTagGen(x j , sk j , M j , Ω, Y, Z): After finishing the medical/health advices, the patient ID j gets his own medical/health data M j . Taking use of the symmetric encryption algorithm, ID j gets the ciphertext
When the above procedures are performed n j times, all the block-tag pairs are created. At last, the patient ID j uploads his block-tag pairs collection {(F i, j , T i, j ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n j } and the warrant-signature pairs (ω j , Sign(ω j )) to PCS. PCS stores the block-tag pairs and the warrant-signature pairs (ω j , Sign(ω j )). The patient deletes these block-tag pairs
Upon receiving (ω j , Sign(ω j )), PCS verifies its validity by using the corresponding verification algorithm Verify. If it is invalid, output "failure". Otherwise, for ev-
z , ω j ) and W i, j = Ωt j (i, j). Then, it verifies whether the following for-
If it holds, then PCS accepts it. Otherwise, PCS rejects it and responds "failure".
GenProof(F, chal p , Σ): Let the challenge be chal p = (c, k 1 , k 2 ) where 1 ≤ c ≤ n, k 1 ∈ Z * q , k 2 ∈ Z * q . Let F be the set of the blocks. Let Σ be the set of the tags. The hospital queries PCS for medical/health data integrity proof of c file blocks. k 1 is used as the random key of the pseudo-random permutation π. k 2 is used as the random key of the pseudorandom function f . PCS performs the procedures below. 
For 1 ≤ i ≤ c, PCS computes the indexes and coefficients below: (I
GenRetr(F, cha r , Σ): Suppose the patient ID j wants to retrieve his own medical/health data blocks (I 1 , j), (I 2 , j), · · · , (I c , j) . ID j sends the challenge chal r = { (I 1 , j) , (I 2 , j), · · · , (I c , j), k 2 } where k 2 ∈ Z * q . Upon receiving the retrieval challenge chal r from the patient ID j , PCS performs the procedures below:
When the hospital and AuthSet cooperate to query PCS to retrieve the patient ID j 's medical/health data, they sends the challenge chal r = {ω j , Sign(ω j ), (I 1 , j), (I 2 , j), · · · , (I c , j), k 2 } to PCS. PCS verifies the warrant-signature pair (ω j , Sign(ω j )). If it is valid and the query complies with the warrant ω j , PCS performs the same procedures as ID j 's retrieval query. Otherwise, rejects it.
CheckProof(y, X j , Y, Z, chal p , V p , ID j ∈ P): Upon receiving the response V p from PCS, the hospital performs the procedures below:
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ c, compute the indexes and coefficients below:
y , ω j i ); 3. Check whether the following formula holds.
e(T, g)
If (1) holds, then the hospital outputs "success". Otherwise, the hospital outputs "failure".
The two cases can be considered. (1) The patient ID j retrieves his own medical/health data. (2) The hospital and AuthSet j cooperate to retrieve ID j 's medical/health data.
The first case, ID j retrieves his own medical/health data below:
x j , ω j ). 3. Check whether the following formula holds.
If the formula (2) holds, the patient ID j accepts the blocks
can be retrieved by using the symmetric encryption key sk j . Otherwise, the patient ID j rejects the response.
The second case, in the authorized set AuthSet j , suppose that th j entities agree to retrieve the patient ID j 's medical/health data. Let the th j entities be
Under the help of the hospital, they cooperate to perform the steps below:
y , ω j ). 2. Check whether the following formula holds.
If the formula (3) holds, they accept the blocks
By using their own shares, these th j entities can compute sk j :
The corresponding plaintext M j = D sk j (F j ) can be retrieved by using the symmetric encryption key sk j . Otherwise, they reject the response.
Security Analysis
The correctness analysis and security analysis of our proposed ICS protocol are given by the lemmas and theorems below: Proof. Since (Sign, Verify) is secure signature-verification algorithm pair, and (ω j , Sign(ω j )) is valid warrant-signature pair, thus, (ω j , Sign(ω j )) can pass the verification. According to the phases of EncTagGen and CheckTagSign, the following formulas hold: Proof. When the patient ID j queries to retrieve his own medical/health data, the verification formula (2) holds based on the theorem 2. Then, it is straightforward to get the medical/health data by decrypting the ciphertext using his own symmetric encryption key sk j . When the hospital and AuthSet j cooperate to retrieve ID j 's medical/health data, by Lagrange interpolation formula, the sk j can be obtained below: Proof. It is similar with the Ref. [10] . We omit it due to the page limits. Proof. From the theorem 2, the hospital can perform all the patients' medical/health data integrity checking. For the patient ID j , he can compute the parameter t j and W i, j . Based on the two parameters, ID j can perform the proof of his own medical/health data integrity below:ê(T, g)
. Except for the hospital, the patients and PCS, the third party has no ability to gett j based on the difficulty of BDHP. Thus, the third party can not also compute Ωt j i (I i , j i ). Finally, the third party can not perform the verification equation:ê (T, g)
Thus, the proposed ICS protocol satisfies restrictive proof of integrity.
Theorem 6 (Restrictive Retrievability).
For the remote medical/health data, the proposed ICS protocol satisfies the property of restrictive retrievability.
Proof. From the theorem 3, the patients have the ability to retrieve their own medical/health data. In the patient ID j 's authorized entities, if at least th j entities agree to retrieve ID j 's remote medical/health data, these authorized entities and the hospital have the ability to cooperate to retrieve ID j 's remote medical/health data. On the contrary, if less than th j − 1 authorized entities agree to retrieve ID j 's data, they only succeed with negligible probability. According to the process of symmetric encryption key distribution, the function F j has the order th j − 1. It can be determined by at least th j points. Less than th j −1 authorized entities can provide less than th j −1 points. F j can not be determined and the symmetric encryption key sk j can not also be determined. Thus, they have no ability to retrieve ID j 's remote medical/health data. 
where PCS has stored n = n 1 + n 2 + · · · + n n p block-tag pairs for n p patients, PCS has corrupted d block-tag pairs, and the challenge is chal p = (c, k 1 , k 2 ).
Proof. It is similar with Ref. [9] . We omit it due to the page limits.
Performance
We implemented our ICS scheme in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme. We used the C programming language with the GMP (GMP-5.0.5), Miracl and PBC (pbc-0.5.13) libraries. In the implementation, PCS ran on the laptop with the following features:
• CPU: Intel Core i7-3517U @ 1.90GHz
• Physical Memory: 4GB DDR3 1600MHz
• OS: Ubuntu 13.04 Linux 3.8.0-19-generic SMP i686
Hospital, Patient and AuthSet ran on a laptop with the following features:
• CPU: CPU I PDC E6700 3.2GHz
• Physical Memory: DDR3 2G
• OS: Ubuntu 11.10 over VMware-workstation-full-8.0.0 Our cryptographic choices were: i) an elliptic curve with 160-bit group order; and iii) AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) as the symmetric encryption algorithm. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose the concept of ICS protocol for critical patients in cloud-based health internet of things. This paper formalizes the system model and security model of ICS protocol. Based on the pairing, a concrete ICS protocol is designed. The proposed ICS protocol is provably secure and efficient by security analysis and performance analysis.
